Assault offenses and Aggravated Assault Charges are very serious crimes in the State of New Jersey. Without competent criminal defense counsel, you could be facing extended jail terms and other penalties. Jersey City Criminal Defense and Assault Defense Lawyer Maximillian Novel has experience in representing people accused of these offenses in the Hudson County Superior Court and elsewhere in New Jersey. Attorney Novel has been successful in defending these charges and has won at trial, an accomplishment many lawyers cannot achieve. Through his education, experience and aggressiveness, Jersey City Defense Lawyer Maximilian Novel has become one of the upcoming leaders in criminal defense in Hudson County, New Jersey.

What makes Jersey City Attorney Novel Different than other Criminal Defense Lawyers in New Jersey?

From your first meeting with attorney Novel, you will know you are dealing with a professional that is serious about defending his clients. Mr. Novel will begin to discuss the options of your case and a case strategy that will give you the best chance to defend the accusations against you.

If you seek a Jersey City Criminal Defense Attorney that understands what is at stake, contact the Novel Law Firm today for a free consultation in their Jersey City office located at 26 Journal Square, Jersey City, NJ.

 

Definitions of assault and assault related crimes.

2C:12-1 Assault.

 

2C:12-1. Assault. a. Simple assault. A person is guilty of assault if he:

 

(1)Attempts to cause or purposely, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another; or

 

(2)Negligently causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon; or

 

(3)Attempts by physical menace to put another in fear of imminent serious bodily injury.

 

Simple assault is a disorderly persons offense unless committed in a fight or scuffle entered into by mutual consent, in which case it is a petty disorderly persons offense.

 

b.Aggravated assault. A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he:

 

(1)Attempts to cause serious bodily injury to another, or causes such injury purposely or knowingly or under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life recklessly causes such injury; or

 

(2)Attempts to cause or purposely or knowingly causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon; or

 

(3)Recklessly causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon; or

 

(4)Knowingly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life points a firearm, as defined in section 2C:39-1f., at or in the direction of another, whether or not the actor believes it to be loaded; or

 

(5)Commits a simple assault as defined in subsection a. (1), (2) or (3) of this section upon:

 

(a)Any law enforcement officer acting in the performance of his duties while in uniform or exhibiting evidence of his authority or because of his status as a law enforcement officer; or

 

(b)Any paid or volunteer fireman acting in the performance of his duties while in uniform or otherwise clearly identifiable as being engaged in the performance of the duties of a fireman; or

 

(c)Any person engaged in emergency first-aid or medical services acting in the performance of his duties while in uniform or otherwise clearly identifiable as being engaged in the performance of emergency first-aid or medical services; or

 

(d)Any school board member, school administrator, teacher, school bus driver or other employee of a public or nonpublic school or school board while clearly identifiable as being engaged in the performance of his duties or because of his status as a member or employee of a public or nonpublic school or school board or any school bus driver employed by an operator under contract to a public or nonpublic school or school board while clearly identifiable as being engaged in the performance of his duties or because of his status as a school bus driver; or

 

(e)Any employee of the Division of Child Protection and Permanency while clearly identifiable as being engaged in the performance of his duties or because of his status as an employee of the division; or

 

(f)Any justice of the Supreme Court, judge of the Superior Court, judge of the Tax Court or municipal judge while clearly identifiable as being engaged in the performance of judicial duties or because of his status as a member of the judiciary; or

 

(g)Any operator of a motorbus or the operator's supervisor or any employee of a rail passenger service while clearly identifiable as being engaged in the performance of his duties or because of his status as an operator of a motorbus or as the operator's supervisor or as an employee of a rail passenger service; or

 

(h)Any Department of Corrections employee, county corrections officer, juvenile corrections officer, State juvenile facility employee, juvenile detention staff member, juvenile detention officer, probation officer or any sheriff, undersheriff, or sheriff's officer acting in the performance of his duties while in uniform or exhibiting evidence of his authority; or

 

(i)Any employee, including any person employed under contract, of a utility company as defined in section 2 of P.L.1971, c.224 (C.2A:42-86) or a cable television company subject to the provisions of the "Cable Television Act," P.L.1972, c.186 (C.48:5A-1 et seq.) while clearly identifiable as being engaged in the performance of his duties in regard to connecting, disconnecting or repairing or attempting to connect, disconnect or repair any gas, electric or water utility, or cable television or telecommunication service; or

 

(j)Any health care worker employed by a licensed health care facility to provide direct patient care, any health care professional licensed or otherwise authorized pursuant to Title 26 or Title 45 of the Revised Statutes to practice a health care profession, except a direct care worker at a State or county psychiatric hospital or State developmental center or veterans' memorial home, while clearly identifiable as being engaged in the duties of providing direct patient care or practicing the health care profession; or

 

(k)Any direct care worker at a State or county psychiatric hospital or State developmental center or veterans' memorial home, while clearly identifiable as being engaged in the duties of providing direct patient care or practicing the health care profession, provided that the actor is not a patient or resident at the facility who is classified by the facility as having a mental illness or developmental disability; or

 

(6)Causes bodily injury to another person while fleeing or attempting to elude a law enforcement officer in violation of subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:29-2 or while operating a motor vehicle in violation of subsection c. of N.J.S.2C:20-10. Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, a person shall be strictly liable for a violation of this subsection upon proof of a violation of subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:29-2 or while operating a motor vehicle in violation of subsection c. of N.J.S.2C:20-10 which resulted in bodily injury to another person; or

 

(7)Attempts to cause significant bodily injury to another or causes significant bodily injury purposely or knowingly or, under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life recklessly causes such significant bodily injury; or

 

(8)Causes bodily injury by knowingly or purposely starting a fire or causing an explosion in violation of N.J.S.2C:17-1 which results in bodily injury to any emergency services personnel involved in fire suppression activities, rendering emergency medical services resulting from the fire or explosion or rescue operations, or rendering any necessary assistance at the scene of the fire or explosion, including any bodily injury sustained while responding to the scene of a reported fire or explosion. For purposes of this subsection, "emergency services personnel" shall include, but not be limited to, any paid or volunteer fireman, any person engaged in emergency first-aid or medical services and any law enforcement officer. Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, a person shall be strictly liable for a violation of this paragraph upon proof of a violation of N.J.S.2C:17-1 which resulted in bodily injury to any emergency services personnel; or

 

(9)Knowingly, under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life, points or displays a firearm, as defined in subsection f. of N.J.S.2C:39-1, at or in the direction of a law enforcement officer; or

 

(10) Knowingly points, displays or uses an imitation firearm, as defined in subsection v. of N.J.S.2C:39-1, at or in the direction of a law enforcement officer with the purpose to intimidate, threaten or attempt to put the officer in fear of bodily injury or for any unlawful purpose; or

 

(11) Uses or activates a laser sighting system or device, or a system or device which, in the manner used, would cause a reasonable person to believe that it is a laser sighting system or device, against a law enforcement officer acting in the performance of his duties while in uniform or exhibiting evidence of his authority. As used in this paragraph, "laser sighting system or device" means any system or device that is integrated with or affixed to a firearm and emits a laser light beam that is used to assist in the sight alignment or aiming of the firearm.

 

Aggravated assault under subsections b. (1) and b. (6) is a crime of the second degree; under subsections b. (2), b. (7), b. (9) and b. (10) is a crime of the third degree; under subsections b. (3) and b. (4) is a crime of the fourth degree; and under subsection b. (5) is a crime of the third degree if the victim suffers bodily injury, otherwise it is a crime of the fourth degree. Aggravated assault under subsection b.(8) is a crime of the third degree if the victim suffers bodily injury; if the victim suffers significant bodily injury or serious bodily injury it is a crime of the second degree. Aggravated assault under subsection b. (11) is a crime of the third degree.

 

c. (1) A person is guilty of assault by auto or vessel when the person drives a vehicle or vessel recklessly and causes either serious bodily injury or bodily injury to another. Assault by auto or vessel is a crime of the fourth degree if serious bodily injury results and is a disorderly persons offense if bodily injury results. Proof that the defendant was operating a hand-held wireless telephone while driving a motor vehicle in violation of section 1 of P.L.2003, c.310 (C.39:4-97.3) may give rise to an inference that the defendant was driving recklessly.

 

(2)Assault by auto or vessel is a crime of the third degree if the person drives the vehicle while in violation of R.S.39:4-50 or section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a) and serious bodily injury results and is a crime of the fourth degree if the person drives the vehicle while in violation of R.S.39:4-50 or section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a) and bodily injury results.

 

(3)Assault by auto or vessel is a crime of the second degree if serious bodily injury results from the defendant operating the auto or vessel while in violation of R.S.39:4-50 or section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a) while:

 

(a)on any school property used for school purposes which is owned by or leased to any elementary or secondary school or school board, or within 1,000 feet of such school property;

 

(b)driving through a school crossing as defined in R.S.39:1-1 if the municipality, by ordinance or resolution, has designated the school crossing as such; or

 

(c)driving through a school crossing as defined in R.S.39:1-1 knowing that juveniles are present if the municipality has not designated the school crossing as such by ordinance or resolution.

 

Assault by auto or vessel is a crime of the third degree if bodily injury results from the defendant operating the auto or vessel in violation of this paragraph.

 

A map or true copy of a map depicting the location and boundaries of the area on or within 1,000 feet of any property used for school purposes which is owned by or leased to any elementary or secondary school or school board produced pursuant to section 1 of P.L.1987, c.101 (C.2C:35-7) may be used in a prosecution under subparagraph (a) of paragraph (3) of this subsection.

 

It shall be no defense to a prosecution for a violation of subparagraph (a) or (b) of paragraph (3) of this subsection that the defendant was unaware that the prohibited conduct took place while on or within 1,000 feet of any school property or while driving through a school crossing. Nor shall it be a defense to a prosecution under subparagraph (a) or (b) of paragraph (3) of this subsection that no juveniles were present on the school property or crossing zone at the time of the offense or that the school was not in session.

 

(4)Assault by auto or vessel is a crime of the third degree if the person purposely drives a vehicle in an aggressive manner directed at another vehicle and serious bodily injury results and is a crime of the fourth degree if the person purposely drives a vehicle in an aggressive manner directed at another vehicle and bodily injury results. For purposes of this paragraph, "driving a vehicle in an aggressive manner" shall include, but is not limited to, unexpectedly altering the speed of the vehicle, making improper or erratic traffic lane changes, disregarding traffic control devices, failing to yield the right of way, or following another vehicle too closely.

 

As used in this section, "vessel" means a means of conveyance for travel on water and propelled otherwise than by muscular power.

 

d.A person who is employed by a facility as defined in section 2 of P.L.1977, c.239 (C.52:27G-2) who commits a simple assault as defined in paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection a. of this section upon an institutionalized elderly person as defined in section 2 of P.L.1977, c.239 (C.52:27G-2) is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree.

 

e.(Deleted by amendment, P.L.2001, c.443).

 

f.A person who commits a simple assault as defined in paragraph (1), (2) or (3) of subsection a. of this section in the presence of a child under 16 years of age at a school or community sponsored youth sports event is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree. The defendant shall be strictly liable upon proof that the offense occurred, in fact, in the presence of a child under 16 years of age. It shall not be a defense that the defendant did not know that the child was present or reasonably believed that the child was 16 years of age or older. The provisions of this subsection shall not be construed to create any liability on the part of a participant in a youth sports event or to abrogate any immunity or defense available to a participant in a youth sports event. As used in this act, "school or community sponsored youth sports event" means a competition, practice or instructional event involving one or more interscholastic sports teams or youth sports teams organized pursuant to a nonprofit or similar charter or which are member teams in a youth league organized by or affiliated with a county or municipal recreation department and shall not include collegiate, semi-professional or professional sporting events.

 

amended 1979, c.178, s.22; 1981, c.290, s.14; 1983, c.101; 1985, c.97, s.2; 1985, c.444; 1990, c.87, s.1; 1991, c.237, s.2; 1991, c.341, s.2; 1993, c.219, s.2; 1995, c.6, s.1; 1995, c.181; 1995, c.211, s.1; 1995, c.307, s.2; 1997, c.42; 1997, c.119; 1999, c.77; 1999, c.185, s.2; 1999, c.281; 1999, c.381; 2001, c.215; 2001, c.443, s.2; 2002, c.53; 2003, c.218; 2005, c.2; 2006, c.78, s.2; 2010, c.109; 2012, c.3; 2012, c.16, s.6; 2012, c.22, s.2.

2C:12-1.1 Knowingly leaving scene of motor vehicle accident resulting in serious bodily injury, third degree crime.

2.A motor vehicle operator who knows he is involved in an accident and knowingly leaves the scene of that accident under circumstances that violate the provisions of R.S.39:4-129 shall be guilty of a crime of the third degree if the accident results in serious bodily injury to another person. The presumption of nonimprisonment set forth in N.J.S.2C:44-1 shall not apply to persons convicted under the provisions of this section.

 

If the evidence so warrants, nothing in this section shall be deemed to preclude an indictment and conviction for aggravated assault or assault by auto under the provisions of N.J.S.2C:12-1.

 

Notwithstanding the provisions of N.J.S.2C:1-8 or any other provisions of law, a conviction arising under this section shall not merge with a conviction for aggravated assault or assault by auto under the provisions of N.J.S.2C:12-1 and a separate sentence shall be imposed upon each conviction.

 

Notwithstanding the provisions of N.J.S.2C:44-5 or any other provisions of law, whenever in the case of such multiple convictions the court imposes multiple sentences of imprisonment for more than one offense, those sentences shall run consecutively.

 

For the purposes of this section, neither knowledge of the serious bodily injury nor knowledge of the violation are elements of the offense and it shall not be a defense that the driver of the motor vehicle was unaware of the serious bodily injury or provisions of R.S.39:4-129.

 

L.1997, c.111, s.2; amended 2003, c.55, s.3; 2007, c.83, s.2.

2C:12-3. Terroristic threats.

 

a.A person is guilty of a crime of the third degree if he threatens to commit any crime of violence with the purpose to terrorize another or to cause evacuation of a building, place of assembly, or facility of public transportation, or otherwise to cause serious public inconvenience, or in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror or inconvenience. A violation of this subsection is a crime of the second degree if it occurs during a declared period of national, State or county emergency. The actor shall be strictly liable upon proof that the crime occurred, in fact, during a declared period of national, State or county emergency. It shall not be a defense that the actor did not know that there was a declared period of emergency at the time the crime occurred.

 

b.A person is guilty of a crime of the third degree if he threatens to kill another with the purpose to put him in imminent fear of death under circumstances reasonably causing the victim to believe the immediacy of the threat and the likelihood that it will be carried out.

 

L.1978, c.95; amended 1981, c.290, s.15; 2002, c.26, s.11.

2C:12-10 Definitions; stalking designated a crime; degrees.

 

1. a. As used in this act:

 

(1)"Course of conduct" means repeatedly maintaining a visual or physical proximity to a person; directly, indirectly, or through third parties, by any action, method, device, or means, following, monitoring, observing, surveilling, threatening, or communicating to or about, a person, or interfering with a person's property; repeatedly committing harassment against a person; or repeatedly conveying, or causing to be conveyed, verbal or written threats or threats conveyed by any other means of communication or threats implied by conduct or a combination thereof directed at or toward a person.

 

(2)"Repeatedly" means on two or more occasions.

 

(3)"Emotional distress" means significant mental suffering or distress.

 

(4)"Cause a reasonable person to fear" means to cause fear which a reasonable victim, similarly situated, would have under the circumstances.

 

b.A person is guilty of stalking, a crime of the fourth degree, if he purposefully or knowingly engages in a course of conduct directed at a specific person that would cause a reasonable person to fear for his safety or the safety of a third person or suffer other emotional distress.

 

c.A person is guilty of a crime of the third degree if he commits the crime of stalking in violation of an existing court order prohibiting the behavior.

 

d.A person who commits a second or subsequent offense of stalking against the same victim is guilty of a crime of the third degree.

 

e.A person is guilty of a crime of the third degree if he commits the crime of stalking while serving a term of imprisonment or while on parole or probation as the result of a conviction for any indictable offense under the laws of this State, any other state or the United States.

 

f.This act shall not apply to conduct which occurs during organized group picketing.

 

L.1992, c.209, s.1; amended 1996, c.39, s.1; 1998, c. 17, s.3; 1999, c.47, s.1; 2001, c.220, s.2; 2009, c.28.

2C:12-10.1 Conviction for stalking, permanent restraining order.

 

3. a. A judgment of conviction for stalking shall operate as an application for a permanent restraining order limiting the contact of the defendant and the victim who was stalked.

 

b.A hearing shall be held on the application for a permanent restraining order at the time of the verdict or plea of guilty unless the victim requests otherwise. This hearing shall be in Superior Court. A permanent restraining order may grant the following specific relief:

 

(1)An order restraining the defendant from entering the residence, property, school, or place of employment of the victim and requiring the defendant to stay away from any specified place that is named in the order and is frequented regularly by the victim.

 

(2)An order restraining the defendant from making contact with the victim, including an order forbidding the defendant from personally or through an agent initiating any communication likely to cause annoyance or alarm including, but not limited to, personal, written, or telephone contact, or contact via electronic device, with the victim, the victim's employers, employees, or fellow workers, or others with whom communication would be likely to cause annoyance or alarm to the victim. As used in this paragraph, "communication" shall have the same meaning as defined in subsection q. of N.J.S.2C:1-14.

2C:12-10.2 Temporary restraining order for alleged stalking; conditions.

 

2. a. In any case involving an allegation of stalking where the victim is a child under the age of 18 years or is developmentally disabled as defined in section 3 of P.L.1977, c.200 (C.5:5-44.4) or where the victim is 18 years of age or older and has a mental disease or defect which renders the victim temporarily or permanently incapable of understanding the nature of his conduct, including, but not limited to, being incapable of providing consent, the court may issue a temporary restraining order against the defendant which limits the contact of the defendant and the victim.

 

b.The provisions of subsection a. of this section are in addition to, and not in lieu of, the provisions of section 3 of P.L.1996, c.39 (C.2C:12-10.1) which provide that a judgment of conviction for stalking shall operate as an application for a permanent restraining order limiting the contact of the defendant and the victim.

 

c.The parent or guardian of the child or the person described in subsection a. of this section may file a complaint with the Superior Court in conformity with the rules of court seeking a temporary restraining order against a person alleged to have committed stalking against the child or the person described in subsection a. of this section. The parent or guardian may seek emergency, ex parte relief. A decision shall be made by the judge regarding the emergency relief forthwith. If it appears that the child or the person described in subsection a. of this section is in danger of being stalked by the defendant, the judge shall issue a temporary restraining order pursuant to subsection e. of this section.

 

d.A conviction of stalking shall not be a prerequisite for the grant of a temporary restraining order under this act.

 

e.A temporary restraining order issued under this act shall limit the contact of the defendant and the child or the person described in subsection a. of this section who was stalked and in addition may grant all other relief specified in section 3 of P.L.1996, c.39 (C.2C:12-10.1).

 

f.A hearing shall be held in the Superior Court within 10 days of the issuance of any temporary restraining order which was issued on an emergency, ex parte basis. A copy of the complaint shall be served on the defendant in conformity with the rules of court. At the hearing the standard for continuing the temporary restraining order shall be by a preponderance of the evidence.

 

g.If the court rules that the temporary restraining order shall be continued, the order shall remain in effect until either:

 

(1)the defendant is convicted of stalking, in which case the court shall hold a hearing on the issue of whether a permanent restraining order shall be entered pursuant to section 3 of P.L.1996, c.39 (C.2C:12-10.1); or 

 

(2)the victim's parent or guardian or, in the case of a victim who has reached the age of 18, the victim, requests that the restraining order be dismissed and the court finds just cause to do so.

 

L.1999, c.47, s.2; amended 2011, c.232, s.1.

2C:12-11 Disarming a law enforcement, corrections officer; crime; degrees.

1. a. A person who knowingly takes or attempts to exercise unlawful control over a firearm or other weapon in the possession of a law enforcement or corrections officer when that officer is acting in the performance of his duties, and either is in uniform or exhibits evidence of his authority, is guilty of a crime of the second degree.

 

b. A person violating the provisions of subsection a. of this section shall be guilty of a crime of the first degree if:

 

(1) The person fires or discharges the firearm;

 

(2) The person uses or threatens to use the firearm or weapon against the officer or any other person; or

 

(3) The officer or another person suffers serious bodily injury.

 

L.1996,c.14.

2C:12-13 Throwing bodily fluid at certain law enforcement officers deemed aggravated assault; grading, sentence.

 

2.A person who throws a bodily fluid at a Department of Corrections employee, county corrections officer, juvenile corrections officer, State juvenile facility employee, juvenile detention staff member, probation officer, any sheriff, undersheriff or sheriff's officer or any municipal, county or State law enforcement officer while in the performance of his duties or otherwise purposely subjects such employee to contact with a bodily fluid commits an aggravated assault. If the victim suffers bodily injury, this shall be a crime of the third degree. Otherwise, this shall be a crime of the fourth degree. A term of imprisonment imposed for this offense shall run consecutively to any term of imprisonment currently being served and to any other term imposed for another offense committed at the time of the assault. Nothing herein shall be deemed to preclude, if the evidence so warrants, an indictment and conviction for a violation or attempted violation of chapter 11 of Title 2C of the New Jersey Statutes or subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:12-1 or any other provision of the criminal laws. 

 

L.1997,c.182,s.2; amended 1999, c.429; 2003, c.283.

2C:33-1. Riot; failure to disperse

a. Riot. A person is guilty of riot if he participates with four or more others in a course of disorderly conduct as defined in section 2C:33-2a:

 

(1) With purpose to commit or facilitate the commission of a crime;

 

(2) With purpose to prevent or coerce official action; or

 

(3) When he or any other participant, known to him, uses or plans to use a firearm or other deadly weapon.

 

Riot if committed under circumstances set forth in paragraph (3) is a crime of the third degree. Otherwise riot is a crime of the fourth degree.

 

b. Failure of disorderly persons to disperse upon official order. Where five or more persons are participating in a course of disorderly conduct as defined in section 2C:33-2 a. likely to cause substantial harm, a peace officer or other public servant engaged in executing or enforcing the law may order the participants and others in the immediate vicinity to disperse. A person who refuses or knowingly fails to obey such an order commits a disorderly persons offense.

 

L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:33-1, eff. Sept. 1, 1979. Amended by L.1979, c. 178, s. 63, eff. Sept. 1, 1979; L.1981, c. 290, s. 35, eff. Sept. 24, 1981.

2C:33-2. Disorderly conduct

a. Improper behavior. A person is guilty of a petty disorderly persons offense, if with purpose to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof he

 

(1) Engages in fighting or threatening, or in violent or tumultuous behavior; or

 

(2) Creates a hazardous or physically dangerous condition by any act which serves no legitimate purpose of the actor.

 

b. Offensive language. A person is guilty of a petty disorderly persons offense if, in a public place, and with purpose to offend the sensibilities of a hearer or in reckless disregard of the probability of so doing, he addresses unreasonably loud and offensively coarse or abusive language, given the circumstances of the person present and the setting of the utterance, to any person present.

 

"Public" means affecting or likely to affect persons in a place to which the public or a substantial group has access; among the places included are highways, transport facilities, schools, prisons, apartment houses, places of business or amusement, or any neighborhood.

 

L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:33-2, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.

2C:33-3 False public alarms.

 

2C:33-3. False Public Alarms. a. Except as provided in subsection b. or c. of this section, a person is guilty of a crime of the third degree if he initiates or circulates a report or warning of an impending fire, explosion, bombing, crime, catastrophe or emergency knowing that the report or warning is false or baseless and that it is likely to cause evacuation of a building, place of assembly, or facility of public transport, or to cause public inconvenience or alarm. A person is guilty of a crime of the third degree if he knowingly causes such false alarm to be transmitted to or within any organization, official or volunteer, for dealing with emergencies involving danger to life or property.

 

b.A person is guilty of a crime of the second degree if in addition to the report or warning initiated, circulated or transmitted under subsection a. of this section, he places or causes to be placed any false or facsimile bomb in a building, place of assembly, or facility of public transport or in a place likely to cause public inconvenience or alarm. A violation of this subsection is a crime of the first degree if it occurs during a declared period of national, State or county emergency.

 

c.A person is guilty of a crime of the second degree if a violation of subsection a. of this section in fact results in serious bodily injury to another person or occurs during a declared period of national, State or county emergency. A person is guilty of a crime of the first degree if a violation of subsection a. of this section in fact results in death.

 

d.For the purposes of this section, "in fact" means that strict liability is imposed. It shall not be a defense that the death or serious bodily injury was not a foreseeable consequence of the person's acts or that the death or serious bodily injury was caused by the actions of another person or by circumstances beyond the control of the actor. The actor shall be strictly liable upon proof that the crime occurred during a declared period of national, State or county emergency. It shall not be a defense that the actor did not know that there was a declared period of emergency at the time the crime occurred.

 

e.A person is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree if the person knowingly places a call to a 9-1-1 emergency telephone system without purpose of reporting the need for 9-1-1 service.

 

L.1978, c.95; amended 1987, c.6; 1994, c.115; 1996, c.63, s.1; 1999, c.195, s.1; 2002, c.26, s.16.

2C:33-4 Harassment.

 

2C:33-4. Harassment.

 

Except as provided in subsection e., a person commits a petty disorderly persons offense if, with purpose to harass another, he:

 

a.Makes, or causes to be made, a communication or communications anonymously or at extremely inconvenient hours, or in offensively coarse language, or any other manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm;

 

b.Subjects another to striking, kicking, shoving, or other offensive touching, or threatens to do so; or

 

c.Engages in any other course of alarming conduct or of repeatedly committed acts with purpose to alarm or seriously annoy such other person.

 

A communication under subsection a. may be deemed to have been made either at the place where it originated or at the place where it was received.

 

d.(Deleted by amendment, P.L.2001, c.443).

 

e.A person commits a crime of the fourth degree if, in committing an offense under this section, he was serving a term of imprisonment or was on parole or probation as the result of a conviction of any indictable offense under the laws of this State, any other state or the United States.

 

L.1978, c.95; amended 1983, c.334; 1990, c.87, s.2; 1995, c.211, s.2; 1998, c.17, s.4; 2001, c.443, s.3.

2C:33-29 Crime of gang criminality; "criminal street gang" defined; grading of offense.

 

1. a. A person is guilty of the crime of gang criminality if, while knowingly involved in criminal street gang activity, he commits, attempts to commit, or conspires to commit, whether as a principal or an accomplice, any crime specified in chapters 11 through 18, 20, 33, 35 or 37 of Title 2C of the New Jersey Statutes; N.J.S.2C:34-1; N.J.S.2C:39-3; N.J.S.2C:39-4; section 1 of P.L.1998, c.26 (C.2C:39-4.1); N.J.S.2C:39-5; or N.J.S.2C:39-9. A crime is committed while involved in a criminal street gang related activity if the crime was committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang.

 

"Criminal street gang" means three or more persons associated in fact. Individuals are associated in fact if: (1) two of the following seven criteria that indicate criminal street gang membership apply: (a) self-proclamation; (b) witness testimony or official statement; (c) written or electronic correspondence; (d) paraphernalia or photographs; (e) tattoos; (f) clothing or colors; (g) any other indicia of street gang activity; and (2) individually or in combination with other members of a criminal street gang, while engaging in gang related activity, have committed or conspired or attempted to commit, within the preceding five years from the date of the present offense, excluding any period of imprisonment, one or more offenses on separate occasions of robbery, carjacking, aggravated assault, assault, aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, arson, burglary, kidnapping, extortion, tampering with witnesses and informants or a violation of chapter 11, section 3, 4, 5, 6, or 7 of chapter 35 or chapter 39 of Title 2C of the New Jersey Statutes. 

 

b.Grading. Gang criminality is a crime of one degree higher than the most serious underlying crime referred to in subsection a. of this section, except that where the underlying crime is a crime of the first degree, gang criminality is a first degree crime and the defendant, upon conviction, and notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (1) of subsection a. of N.J.S.2C:43-6, shall be sentenced to an ordinary term of imprisonment between 15 and 30 years. A sentence imposed upon conviction of the crime of gang criminality shall be ordered to be served consecutively to the sentence imposed upon conviction of any underlying offense referred to in subsection a. of this section.

 

L.2007, c.341, s.1.

2C:33-30 Crime of promotion of organized street crime; grading of offense.

 

2. a. A person promotes organized street crime if he conspires with others as an organizer, supervisor, financier or manager to commit any crime specified in chapters 11 through 18, 20, 33, 35, or 37 of Title 2C of the New Jersey Statutes; N.J.S.2C:34-1; N.J.S.2C:39-3; N.J.S.2C:39-4; section 1 of P.L.1998, c.26 (C.2C:39-4.1); N.J.S.2C:39-5; or N.J.S.2C:39-9.

 

b.Grading. Promotion of organized street crime is a crime of one degree higher than the most serious underlying crime referred to in subsection a. of this section, except that where the underlying offense is a crime of the first degree, promotion of organized street crime is a first degree crime and the defendant, upon conviction, and notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (1) of subsection a of N.J.S.2C:43-6, shall be sentenced to an ordinary term of imprisonment between 15 and 30 years. A sentence imposed upon conviction of the crime of promotion of organized street crime shall be ordered to be served consecutively to the sentence imposed upon conviction of any underlying offense referred to in subsection a. of this section.

 

L.2007, c.341, s.2.

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