Effective criminal defense requires a deep understanding of the law and the unique facts of each case. From there , Jersey City Criminal Defense Lawyer Maximillian Novel begins his case strategy and preparation. Attorney Novel takes the time needed  by working seven days a week so that he knows all aspects of your case. Whether it is an assault case, theft, manslaughter or any other criminal law matter, Mr. Novel can handle it. Some defenses that are used in various cases are:

2C:2-4. Ignorance or mistake

a. Ignorance or mistake as to a matter of fact or law is a defense if the defendant reasonably arrived at the conclusion underlying the mistake and:

 

(1) It negatives the culpable mental state required to establish the offense; or

 

(2) The law provides that the state of mind established by such ignorance or mistake constitutes a defense.

 

b. Although ignorance or mistake would otherwise afford a defense to the offense charged, the defense is not available if the defendant would be guilty of another offense had the situation been as he supposed. In such case, however, the ignorance or mistake of the defendant shall reduce the grade and degree of the offense of which he may be convicted to those of the offense of which he would be guilty had the situation been as he supposed.

 

c. A belief that conduct does not legally constitute an offense is a defense to a prosecution for that offense based upon such conduct when:

 

(1) The statute defining the offense is not known to the actor and has not been published or otherwise reasonably made available prior to the conduct alleged; or

 

(2) The actor acts in reasonable reliance upon an official statement of the law, afterward determined to be invalid or erroneous, contained in (a) a statute, (b) judicial decision, opinion, judgment, or rule, (c) an administrative order or grant of permission, or (d) an official interpretation of the public officer or body charged by law with responsibility for the interpretation, administration or enforcement of the law defining the offense; or

 

(3) The actor otherwise diligently pursues all means available to ascertain the meaning and application of the offense to his conduct and honestly and in good faith concludes his conduct is not an offense in circumstances in which a law-abiding and prudent person would also so conclude.

 

The defendant must prove a defense arising under subsection c. of this section by clear and convincing evidence.

 

L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:2-4, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.

2C:2-5. Defenses generally

Conduct which would otherwise be an offense is excused or alleviated by reason of any defense now provided by law for which neither the code nor other statutory law defining the offense provides exceptions or defenses dealing with the specific situation involved and a legislative purpose to exclude the defense claimed does not otherwise plainly appear.

 

L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:2-5, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.

2C:2-6. Liability for conduct of another; complicity

a. A person is guilty of an offense if it is committed by his own conduct or by the conduct of another person for which he is legally accountable, or both.

 

b. A person is legally accountable for the conduct of another person when:

 

(1) Acting with the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the commission of the offense, he causes an innocent or irresponsible person to engage in such conduct;

 

(2) He is made accountable for the conduct of such other person by the code or by the law defining the offense;

 

(3) He is an accomplice of such other person in the commission of an offense; or

 

(4) He is engaged in a conspiracy with such other person.

 

c. A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of an offense if:

 

(1) With the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense; he

 

(a) Solicits such other person to commit it;

 

(b) Aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in planning or committing it; or

 

(c) Having a legal duty to prevent the commission of the offense, fails to make proper effort so to do; or

 

(2) His conduct is expressly declared by law to establish his complicity.

 

d. A person who is legally incapable of committing a particular offense himself may be guilty thereof if it is committed by another person for whose conduct he is legally accountable, unless such liability is inconsistent with the purpose of the provision establishing his incapacity.

 

e. Unless otherwise provided by the code or by the law defining the offense, a person is not an accomplice in an offense committed by another person if:

 

(1) He is a victim of that offense;

 

(2) The offense is so defined that his conduct is inevitably incident to its commission; or

 

(3) He terminates his complicity under circumstances manifesting a complete and voluntary renunciation as defined in section 2C:5-1 d. prior to the commission of the offense. Termination by renunciation is an affirmative defense which the defendant must prove by a preponderance of evidence.

 

f. An accomplice may be convicted on proof of the commission of the offense and of his complicity therein, though the person claimed to have committed the offense has not been prosecuted or convicted or has been convicted of a different offense or degree of offense or has an immunity to prosecution or conviction or has been acquitted.

 

L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:2-6, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.

2C:2-8. Intoxication

a. Except as provided in subsection d. of this section, intoxication of the actor is not a defense unless it negatives an element of the offense.

 

b. When recklessness establishes an element of the offense, if the actor, due to self-induced intoxication, is unaware of a risk of which he would have been aware had he been sober, such unawareness is immaterial.

 

c. Intoxication does not, in itself, constitute mental disease within the meaning of chapter 4.

 

d. Intoxication which (1) is not self-induced or (2) is pathological is an affirmative defense if by reason of such intoxication the actor at the time of his conduct did not know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know it, that he did not know what he was doing was wrong. Intoxication under this subsection must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.

 

e. Definitions. In this section unless a different meaning plainly is required:

 

(1) "Intoxication" means a disturbance of mental or physical capacities resulting from the introduction of substances into the body;

 

(2) "Self-induced intoxication" means intoxication caused by substances which the actor knowingly introduces into his body, the tendency of which to cause intoxication he knows or ought to know, unless he introduces them pursuant to medical advice or under such circumstances as would afford a defense to a charge of crime;

 

(3) "Pathological intoxication" means intoxication grossly excessive in degree, given the amount of the intoxicant, to which the actor does not know he is susceptible.

 

L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:2-8, eff. Sept. 1, 1979. Amended by L.1983, c. 306, s. 1, eff. Aug. 26, 1983.

2C:2-9. Duress

a. Subject to subsection b. of this section, it is an affirmative defense that the actor engaged in the conduct charged to constitute an offense because he was coerced to do so by the use of, or a threat to use, unlawful force against his person or the person of another, which a person of reasonable firmness in his situation would have been unable to resist.

 

b. The defense provided by this section is unavailable if the actor recklessly placed himself in a situation in which it was probable that he would be subjected to duress. The defense is also unavailable if he was criminally negligent in placing himself in such a situation, whenever criminal negligence suffices to establish culpability for the offense charged. In a prosecution for murder, the defense is only available to reduce the degree of the crime to manslaughter.

 

c. It is not a defense that a woman acted on the command of her husband, unless she acted under such coercion as would establish a defense under this section. The presumption that a woman, acting in the presence of her husband, is coerced is abolished.

 

L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:2-9, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.

2C:2-10. Consent

a. In general. The consent of the victim to conduct charged to constitute an offense or to the result thereof is a defense if such consent negatives an element of the offense or precludes the infliction of the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense.

 

b. Consent to bodily harm. When conduct is charged to constitute an offense because it causes or threatens bodily harm, consent to such conduct or to the infliction of such harm is a defense if:

 

(1) The bodily harm consented to or threatened by the conduct consented to is not serious; or

 

(2) The conduct and the harm are reasonably foreseeable hazards of joint participation in a concerted activity of a kind not forbidden by law; or

 

(3) The consent establishes a justification for the conduct under chapter 3 of the code.

 

c. Ineffective consent. Unless otherwise provided by the code or by the law defining the offense, assent does not constitute consent if:

 

(1) It is given by a person who is legally incompetent to authorize the conduct charged to constitute the offense; or

 

(2) It is given by a person who by reason of youth, mental disease or defect or intoxication is manifestly unable or known by the actor to be unable to make a reasonable judgment as to the nature of harmfulness of the conduct charged to constitute an offense; or

 

(3) It is induced by force, duress or deception of a kind sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense.

 

L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:2-10, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.

2C:2-11. De minimis infractions

The assignment judge may dismiss a prosecution if, having regard to the nature of the conduct charged to constitute an offense and the nature of the attendant circumstances, it finds that the defendant's conduct:

 

a. Was within a customary license or tolerance, neither expressly negated by the person whose interest was infringed nor inconsistent with the purpose of the law defining the offense;

 

b. Did not actually cause or threaten the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense or did so only to an extent too trivial to warrant the condemnation of conviction; or

 

c. Presents such other extenuations that it cannot reasonably be regarded as envisaged by the Legislature in forbidding the offense. The assignment judge shall not dismiss a prosecution under this section without giving the prosecutor notice and an opportunity to be heard. The prosecutor shall have a right to appeal any such dismissal.

 

L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:2-11, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.

2C:3-1. Justification an affirmative defense; civil remedies unaffected

a. In any prosecution based on conduct which is justifiable under this chapter, justification is an affirmative defense.

 

b. The fact that conduct is justifiable under this chapter does not abolish or impair any remedy for such conduct which is available in any civil action.

 

L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:3-1, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.

2C:3-2. Necessity and other justifications in general

a. Necessity. Conduct which would otherwise be an offense is justifiable by reason of necessity to the extent permitted by law and as to which neither the code nor other statutory law defining the offense provides exceptions or defenses dealing with the specific situation involved and a legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed does not otherwise plainly appear.

 

b. Other justifications in general. Conduct which would otherwise be an offense is justifiable by reason of any defense of justification provided by law for which neither the code nor other statutory law defining the offense provides exceptions or defenses dealing with the specific situation involved and a legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed does not otherwise plainly appear.

 

L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:3-2, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.

2C:3-3. Execution of public duty

a. Except as provided in subsection b. of this section, conduct is justifiable when it is required or authorized by:

 

(1) The law defining the duties or functions of a public officer or the assistance to be rendered to such officer in the performance of his duties;

 

(2) The law governing the execution of legal process;

 

(3) The judgment or order of a competent court or tribunal;

 

(4) The law governing the armed services or the lawful conduct of war; or

 

(5) Any other provision of law imposing a public duty.

 

b. The other sections of this chapter apply to:

 

(1) The use of force upon or toward the person of another for any of the purposes dealt with in such sections; and

 

(2) The use of deadly force for any purpose, unless the use of such force is otherwise expressly authorized by law.

 

c. The justification afforded by subsection a. of this section applies:

 

(1) When the actor reasonably believes his conduct to be required or authorized by the judgment or direction of a competent court or tribunal or in the lawful execution of legal process, notwithstanding lack of jurisdiction of the court or defect in the legal process; and

 

(2) When the actor reasonably believes his conduct to be required or authorized to assist a public officer in the performance of his duties, notwithstanding that the officer exceeded his legal authority.

 

L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:3-3, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.

2C:3-4 Use of force in self-protection.

 

2C:3-4. Use of Force in Self-Protection. a. Use of force justifiable for protection of the person. Subject to the provisions of this section and of section 2C:3-9, the use of force upon or toward another person is justifiable when the actor reasonably believes that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by such other person on the present occasion.

 

b.Limitations on justifying necessity for use of force.

 

(1)The use of force is not justifiable under this section:

 

(a)To resist an arrest which the actor knows is being made by a peace officer in the performance of his duties, although the arrest is unlawful, unless the peace officer employs unlawful force to effect such arrest; or

 

(b)To resist force used by the occupier or possessor of property or by another person on his behalf, where the actor knows that the person using the force is doing so under a claim of right to protect the property, except that this limitation shall not apply if:

 

(i)The actor is a public officer acting in the performance of his duties or a person lawfully assisting him therein or a person making or assisting in a lawful arrest;

 

(ii)The actor has been unlawfully dispossessed of the property and is making a reentry or recaption justified by section 2C:3-6; or

 

(iii) The actor reasonably believes that such force is necessary to protect himself against death or serious bodily harm.

 

(2)The use of deadly force is not justifiable under this section unless the actor reasonably believes that such force is necessary to protect himself against death or serious bodily harm; nor is it justifiable if:

 

(a)The actor, with the purpose of causing death or serious bodily harm, provoked the use of force against himself in the same encounter; or

 

(b)The actor knows that he can avoid the necessity of using such force with complete safety by retreating or by surrendering possession of a thing to a person asserting a claim of right thereto or by complying with a demand that he abstain from any action which he has no duty to take, except that:

 

(i)The actor is not obliged to retreat from his dwelling, unless he was the initial aggressor; and

 

(ii)A public officer justified in using force in the performance of his duties or a person justified in using force in his assistance or a person justified in using force in making an arrest or preventing an escape is not obliged to desist from efforts to perform such duty, effect such arrest or prevent such escape because of resistance or threatened resistance by or on behalf of the person against whom such action is directed.

 

(3)Except as required by paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection, a person employing protective force may estimate the necessity of using force when the force is used, without retreating, surrendering possession, doing any other act which he has no legal duty to do or abstaining from any lawful action.

 

c. (1) Notwithstanding the provisions of N.J.S.2C:3-5, N.J.S.2C:3-9, or this section, the use of force or deadly force upon or toward an intruder who is unlawfully in a dwelling is justifiable when the actor reasonably believes that the force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself or other persons in the dwelling against the use of unlawful force by the intruder on the present occasion.

 

(2)A reasonable belief exists when the actor, to protect himself or a third person, was in his own dwelling at the time of the offense or was privileged to be thereon and the encounter between the actor and intruder was sudden and unexpected, compelling the actor to act instantly and:

 

(a)The actor reasonably believed that the intruder would inflict personal injury upon the actor or others in the dwelling; or

 

(b)The actor demanded that the intruder disarm, surrender or withdraw, and the intruder refused to do so.

 

(3)An actor employing protective force may estimate the necessity of using force when the force is used, without retreating, surrendering possession, withdrawing or doing any other act which he has no legal duty to do or abstaining from any lawful action.

 

L.1978, c.95; amended 1987, c.120, s.1; 1999, c.73.

2C:3-5. Use of force for the protection of other persons

a. Subject to the provisions of this section and of section 2C:3-9, the use of force upon or toward the person of another is justifiable to protect a third person when:

 

(1) The actor would be justified under section 2C:3-4 in using such force to protect himself against the injury he believes to be threatened to the person whom he seeks to protect; and

 

(2) Under the circumstances as the actor reasonably believes them to be, the person whom he seeks to protect would be justified in using such protective force; and

 

(3) The actor reasonably believes that his intervention is necessary for the protection of such other person.

 

b. Notwithstanding subsection a. of this section:

 

(1) When the actor would be obliged under section 2C:3-4 b. (2)(b) to retreat or take other action he is not obliged to do so before using force for the protection of another person, unless he knows that he can thereby secure the complete safety of such other person, and

 

(2) When the person whom the actor seeks to protect would be obliged under section 2C:3-4 b. (2)(b) to retreat or take similar action if he knew that he could obtain complete safety by so doing, the actor is obliged to try to cause him to do so before using force in his protection if the actor knows that he can obtain complete safety in that way; and

 

(3) Neither the actor nor the person whom he seeks to protect is obliged to retreat when in the other's dwelling to any greater extent than in his own.

 

L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:3-5, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.

2C:3-6. Use of force in defense of premises or personal property 

Use of Force in Defense of Premises or Personal Property. a. Use of force in defense of premises. Subject to the provisions of this section and of section 2C:3-9, the use of force upon or toward the person of another is justifiable when the actor is in possession or control of premises or is licensed or privileged to be thereon and he reasonably believes such force necessary to prevent or terminate what he reasonably believes to be the commission or attempted commission of a criminal trespass by such other person in or upon such premises. 

 

b. Limitations on justifiable use of force in defense of premises. 

 

(1) Request to desist. The use of force is justifiable under this section only if the actor first requests the person against whom such force is used to desist from his interference with the property, unless the actor reasonably believes that: 

 

(a) Such request would be useless; 

 

(b) It would be dangerous to himself or another person to make the request; or 

 

(c) Substantial harm will be done to the physical condition of the property which is sought to be protected before the request can effectively be made. 

 

(2) Exclusion of trespasser. The use of force is not justifiable under this section if the actor knows that the exclusion of the trespasser will expose him to substantial danger of serious bodily harm. 

 

(3) Use of deadly force. The use of deadly force is not justifiable under subsection a. of this section unless the actor reasonably believes that:

 

(a) The person against whom the force is used is attempting to dispossess him of his dwelling otherwise than under a claim of right to its possession; or 

 

(b) The person against whom the force is used is attempting to commit or consummate arson, burglary, robbery or other criminal theft or property destruction; except that 

 

(c) Deadly force does not become justifiable under subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this subsection unless the actor reasonably believes that: 

 

(i) The person against whom it is employed has employed or threatened deadly force against or in the presence of the actor; or 

 

(ii) The use of force other than deadly force to terminate or prevent the commission or the consummation of the crime would expose the actor or another in his presence to substantial danger of bodily harm. An actor within a dwelling shall be presumed to have a reasonable belief in the existence of the danger. The State must rebut this presumption by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 

 

c. Use of force in defense of personal property. Subject to the provisions of subsection d. of this section and of section 2C:3-9, the use of force upon or toward the person of another is justifiable when the actor reasonably believes it necessary to prevent what he reasonably believes to be an attempt by such other person to commit theft, criminal mischief or other criminal interference with personal property in his possession or in the possession of another for whose protection he acts. 

 

d. Limitations on justifiable use of force in defense of personal property. 

 

(1) Request to desist and exclusion of trespasser. The limitations of subsection b. (1) and (2) of this section apply to subsection c. of this section. 

 

(2) Use of deadly force. The use of deadly force in defense of personal property is not justified unless justified under another provision of this chapter. 

 

L.1978, c.95; amended by L. 1987, c. 120, s. 2. 

2C:3-7. Use of force in law enforcement

a. Use of force justifiable to effect an arrest. Subject to the provisions of this section and of section 2C:3-9, the use of force upon or toward the person of another is justifiable when the actor is making or assisting in making an arrest and the actor reasonably believes that such force is immediately necessary to effect a lawful arrest.

 

b. Limitations on the use of force.

 

(1) The use of force is not justifiable under this section unless:

 

(a) The actor makes known the purpose of the arrest or reasonably believes that it is otherwise known by or cannot reasonably be made known to the person to be arrested; and

 

(b) When the arrest is made under a warrant, the warrant is valid or reasonably believed by the actor to be valid.

 

(2) The use of deadly force is not justifiable under this section unless:

 

(a) The actor effecting the arrest is authorized to act as a peace officer or has been summoned by and is assisting a person whom he reasonably believes to be authorized to act as a peace officer; and

 

(b) The actor reasonably believes that the force employed creates no substantial risk of injury to innocent persons; and

 

(c) The actor reasonably believes that the crime for which the arrest is made was homicide, kidnapping, an offense under 2C:14-2 or 2C:14-3, arson, robbery, burglary of a dwelling, or an attempt to commit one of these crimes; and

 

(d) The actor reasonably believes:

 

(i) There is an imminent threat of deadly force to himself or a third party; or

 

(ii) The use of deadly force is necessary to thwart the commission of a crime as set forth in subparagraph (c) of this paragraph; or

 

(iii) The use of deadly force is necessary to prevent an escape.

 

c. Use of force to prevent escape from custody. The use of force to prevent the escape of an arrested person from custody is justifiable when the force could, under subsections a. and b. of this section, have been employed to effect the arrest under which the person is in custody. A correction officer or other person authorized to act as a peace officer is, however, justified in using any force including deadly force, which he reasonably believes to be immediately necessary to prevent the escape of a person committed to a jail, prison, or other institution for the detention of persons charged with or convicted of an offense so long as the actor believes that the force employed creates no substantial risk of injury to innocent persons.

 

d. Use of force by private person assisting an unlawful arrest.

 

(1) A private person who is summoned by a peace officer to assist in effecting an unlawful arrest is justified in using any force which he would be justified in using if the arrest were lawful, provided that he does not believe the arrest is unlawful.

 

(2) A private person who assists another private person in effecting an unlawful arrest, or who, not being summoned, assists a peace officer in effecting an unlawful arrest, is justified in using any force which he would be justified in using if the arrest were lawful, provided that (a) he reasonably believes the arrest is lawful, and (b) the arrest would be lawful if the facts were as he believes them to be and such belief is reasonable.

 

e. Use of force to prevent suicide or the commission of a crime. The use of force upon or toward the person of another is justifiable when the actor reasonably believes that such force is immediately necessary to prevent such other person from committing suicide, inflicting serious bodily harm upon himself, committing or consummating the commission of a crime involving or threatening bodily harm, damage to or loss of property or a breach of the peace, except that:

 

(1) Any limitations imposed by the other provisions of this chapter on the justifiable use of force in self-protection, for the protection of others, the protection of property, the effectuation of an arrest or the prevention of an escape from custody shall apply notwithstanding the criminality of the conduct against which such force is used; and

 

(2) The use of deadly force is not in any event justifiable under this subsection unless the actor reasonably believes that it is likely that the person whom he seeks to prevent from committing a crime will endanger human life or inflict serious bodily harm upon another unless the commission or the consummation of the crime is prevented and that the use of such force presents no substantial risk of injury to innocent persons.

 

L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:3-7, eff. Sept. 1, 1979. Amended by L.1979, c. 178, s. 10, eff. Sept. 1, 1979; L.1981, c. 290, s. 5, eff. Sept. 24, 1981.

2C:3-9. Mistake of law as to unlawfulness of force or legality of arrest; reckless or negligent use of excessive but otherwise justifiable force; reckless or negligent injury or risk of injury to innocent persons

a. The justification afforded by sections 2C:3-4 to 2C:3-7 is unavailable when:

 

(1) The actor's belief in the unlawfulness of the force or conduct against which he employs protective force or his belief in the lawfulness of an arrest which he endeavors to effect by force is erroneous; and

 

(2) His error is due to ignorance or mistake as to the provisions of the code, any other provisions of the criminal law or the law governing the legality of an arrest or search.

 

b. (Deleted by amendment; P.L.1981, c. 290.)

 

c. When the actor is justified under sections 2C:3-3 to 2C:3-8 in using force upon or toward the person of another but he recklessly or negligently injures or creates a risk of injury to innocent persons, the justification afforded by those sections is unavailable in a prosecution for such recklessness or negligence towards innocent persons.

 

L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:3-9, eff. Sept. 1, 1979. Amended by L.1981, c. 290, s. 6, eff. Sept. 24, 1981.

2C:3-10. Justification in property crimes

Conduct involving the appropriation, seizure or destruction of, damage to, intrusion on, or interference with, property is justifiable under circumstances which would establish a defense of privilege in a civil action based thereon, unless:

 

a. The code or the law defining the offense deals with the specific situation involved; or

 

b. A legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed otherwise plainly appears.

 

L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:3-10, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.

2C:4-1. Insanity defense

A person is not criminally responsible for conduct if at the time of such conduct he was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know it, that he did not know what he was doing was wrong. Insanity is an affirmative defense which must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence.

 

L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:4-1, eff. Sept. 1, 1979. Amended by L.1979, c. 178, s. 11A, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.

2C:4-2. Evidence of mental disease or defect admissible when relevant to element of the offense 

2C:4-2. Evidence of mental disease or defect admissible when relevant to element of the offense. 

 

Evidence that the defendant suffered from a mental disease or defect is admissible whenever it is relevant to prove that the defendant did not have a state of mind which is an element of the offense. In the absence of such evidence, it may be presumed that the defendant had no mental disease or defect which would negate a state of mind which is an element of the offense. 

 

L.1978, c.95; amended 1979,c.178,s.11B; 1981,c.290,s.8; 1990,c.63. 

2C:4-4. Mental incompetence excluding fitness to proceed

a. No person who lacks capacity to understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his own defense shall be tried, convicted or sentenced for the commission of an offense so long as such incapacity endures.

 

b. A person shall be considered mentally competent to stand trial on criminal charges if the proofs shall establish:

 

(1) That the defendant has the mental capacity to appreciate his presence in relation to time, place and things; and

 

(2) That his elementary mental processes are such that he comprehends:

 

(a) That he is in a court of justice charged with a criminal offense;

 

(b) That there is a judge on the bench;

 

(c) That there is a prosecutor present who will try to convict him of a criminal charge;

 

(d) That he has a lawyer who will undertake to defend him against that charge;

 

(e) That he will be expected to tell to the best of his mental ability the facts surrounding him at the time and place where the alleged violation was committed if he chooses to testify and understands the right not to testify;

 

(f) That there is or may be a jury present to pass upon evidence adduced as to guilt or innocence of such charge or, that if he should choose to enter into plea negotiations or to plead guilty, that he comprehend the consequences of a guilty plea and that he be able to knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive those rights which are waived upon such entry of a guilty plea; and

 

(g) That he has the ability to participate in an adequate presentation of his defense.

 

L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:4-4, eff. Sept. 1, 1979. Amended by L.1979, c. 178, s. 13, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.

2C:4-8. Commitment of a person by reason of insanity

2C:4-8. Commitment of a Person by Reason of Insanity. a. After acquittal by reason of insanity, the court shall order that the defendant undergo a psychiatric examination by a psychiatrist of the prosecutor's choice. If the examination cannot take place because of the unwillingness of the defendant to participate, the court shall proceed as in section 2C:4-5c. The defendant, pursuant to this section, may also be examined by a psychiatrist of his own choice.

 

b. The court shall dispose of the defendant in the following manner:

 

(1) If the court finds that the defendant may be released without danger to the community or himself without supervision, the court shall so release the defendant; or

 

(2) If the court finds that the defendant may be released without danger to the community or to himself under supervision or under conditions, the court shall so order; or

 

(3) If the court finds that the defendant cannot be released with or without supervision or conditions without posing a danger to the community or to himself, it shall commit the defendant to a mental health facility approved for this purpose by the Commissioner of Human Services to be treated as a person civilly committed. In all proceedings conducted pursuant to this section and pursuant to section N.J.S.2C:4-6 concerning a defendant who lacks the fitness to proceed, including any periodic review proceeding, the prosecuting attorney shall have the right to appear and be heard. The defendant's continued commitment, under the law governing civil commitment, shall be established by a preponderance of the evidence, during the maximum period of imprisonment that could have been imposed, as an ordinary term of imprisonment, for any charge on which the defendant has been acquitted by reason of insanity. Expiration of that maximum period of imprisonment shall be calculated by crediting the defendant with any time spent in confinement for the charge or charges on which the defendant has been acquitted by reason of insanity.

 

c. No person committed under this section shall be confined within any penal or correctional institution or any part thereof.

 

L.1978, c.95; amended 1979, c.178, s.15; 1981, c.290, s.9; 1996, c.133, s.2.

2C:4-9. Release of persons committed by reason of insanity

2C:4-9. Release of Persons Committed by Reason of Insanity.

 

a. If a person has been committed pursuant to section 2C:4-8 or section 2C:4-6 and if the commissioner, or his designee, or the superintendent of the institution to which the person has been committed, is of the view that a person committed to his custody, pursuant to section 2C:4-8 or section 2C:4-6, may be discharged or released on condition without danger to himself or to others, or that he may be transferred to a less restrictive setting for treatment, the commissioner or superintendent shall make application for the discharge or release of such person in a report to the court by which such person was committed and shall transmit a copy of such application and report to the prosecutor, the court, and defense counsel. The court may, in its discretion, appoint at least two qualified psychiatrists, neither of whom may be on the staff of the hospital to which the defendant had been committed, to examine such person and to report within 30 days, or such longer period as the court determines to be necessary for the purpose, their opinion as to his mental condition.

 

b. The court shall hold a hearing to determine whether the committed person may be safely discharged, released on condition without danger to himself or others, or treated as in civil commitment. The hearing shall be held upon notice to the prosecutor and with the prosecutor's opportunity to be heard. Any such hearing shall be deemed a civil proceeding. According to the determination of the court upon the hearing, the court shall proceed as in section 2C:4-8b. (1), (2) or (3).

 

c. A committed person may make application for his discharge or release to the court by which he was committed, and the procedure to be followed upon such application shall be the same as that prescribed above in the case of an application by the commissioner.

 

d. Each defendant's case shall be specifically reviewed as provided by the law governing civil commitment.

 

L.1978, c.95; amended 1979, c.178, s.16; 1996, c.133, s.3.

2C:2-12. Entrapment

a. A public law enforcement official or a person engaged in cooperation with such an official or one acting as an agent of a public law enforcement official perpetrates an entrapment if for the purpose of obtaining evidence of the commission of an offense, he induces or encourages and, as a direct result, causes another person to engage in conduct constituting such offense by either:

 

(1) Making knowingly false representations designed to induce the belief that such conduct is not prohibited; or

 

(2) Employing methods of persuasion or inducement which create a substantial risk that such an offense will be committed by persons other than those who are ready to commit it.

 

b. Except as provided in subsection c. of this section, a person prosecuted for an offense shall be acquitted if he proves by a preponderance of evidence that his conduct occurred in response to an entrapment. The issue of entrapment shall be tried by the trier of fact.

 

c. The defense afforded by this section is unavailable when causing or threatening bodily injury is an element of the offense charged and the prosecution is based on conduct causing or threatening such injury to a person other than the person perpetrating the entrapment.

L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:2-12, eff. Sept. 1, 1979. Amended by L.1979, c. 178, s. 9, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.

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